Abstract: In this paper we examine how Finnish municipalities' expenditures depend on the demographic structure of the population. More precisely, we scrutinize the role of foreign citizens: how does the share of citizens with foreign background out of the total population manifest itself in total expenditures and some key expenditure categories. The study makes use of Finnish panel data from 249 municipalities for the period 2000-2014. Empirical analyses show that foreign population tends to increase per capita expenditures up to the point where the respective semi-elasticity is about one. The result seems robust in terms of different control variables, subsamples of the data and different estimation techniques. Also, it is found that the unemployment rate of foreign citizens tends to increase municipalities' expenditures. Thus, opposite to standard assumptions, per capita public consumption expenditures do depend on migration and that should be taken into account when making assessments on overall fiscal effects of migration. From political economy point of view, these results seem to be at variance with the "non-willingness to pay other ethnic groups' expenditures" hypothesis that has been put forward by e. g. Alberto Alesina and Assaf Razin.
Introduction
Currently, most European countries experience large flows of immigration that are manifested in many ways in the political landscape, labor markets and government expenditures and revenues. Our knowledge about the economic consequences of these migration flows is still deficient even though migration to European countries is not a new phenomenon (consider e. g. migration to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, migration to Portugal after the 1974 revolution and more recent labor flows from the Eastern Europe to Western Europe after the fall of communism 1 ). Even though, we have previously experienced many periods of migration, it is not easy to generalize the findings because there have been huge differences in labor market conditions (in both emigration and immigration countries), skill levels, linguistic abilities, cultural background and so on (cf. ANGRIST and KUGLER 2003) . Thus, we cannot simply count the number of people, but more detailed information is needed. Here, we try to provide some new evidence on this issue. But we only deal with expenditures and, moreover, we only focus on local authorities' expenditures and scrutinize how the share of migrant population affects the expenditures of public services.
2 Are these expenditures unrelated to immigration, and if not, how the expenditures develop with different levels of immigration! Although we cannot really develop any sort of cost-benefit analysis of migration, we can thereby cover an area which is rather poorly analyzed in most economy-wide analyses. Practically all economy-wide analyses like LIEBIG and MO (2013) , HOLMØY and STRØM (2012) and ALDEN and HAMMARSTEDT (2016) concentrate on (net) income transfers to public sector and either ignore public consumption/ production entirely or assume that (per capita) expenditures are equal with native population and immigrants. Although these assumptions can be defended by lack of data they are not innocent and clearly require closer scrutiny. The local authorities' view is particularly important for countries like Finland where most (over two thirds) of public services are provided by municipalities (which also cover most of their expenditures by their own tax revenues). Thus far, migration to Finland has been relatively small; people with foreign background represent only about 6 % of the total population and in many municipalities there are only a few or even zero foreigners. By far the biggest group of immigrants comes from Estonia, which is very close to Finland in terms of linguistic, religious and other characteristics. Recently, most immigrants have been coming from the Near East and North Africa along with the refugee flows. All in all, the immigrant population is very heterogeneous. In terms of labor market performance, immigrants typically fall behind domestic population. In recent years, their unemployment rates have been roughly 30 % while the figure for the total population is below ten. There is also a 20-percentage point difference in employment rate and a five percentage point difference in the employment/population rate. Moreover, immigrants' pre-tax incomes are much lower than those of the domestic population (immigrants earnings are only somewhat above 50 % of the corresponding income of the domestic population). 3 In general, the effects of migration have been studied rather extensively although the emphasis has been on the labor market (cf. e. g. BORJAS (2003, 2009, 2013 and 2015) , CARD (1990) and CARRINGTON and DE LIMA (1996) . 4 These analyses have utilized such "natural experiments" as the Cuban immigration wave (so-called Marielitos) to the US in the 1970s (CARD, 1990; BORJAS, 2015) , Portuguese citizens' escape form former colonies in the mid-1970s (CARRINGTON and DE LIMA, 1996) , French citizens' immigration to France after the Algerian Independence (HUNT, 1992) and mass immigration to Israel after the collapse of communism in East Europe (FRIEDBERG, 2001) . Immigration of Mexicans (and other Latin Americans) to the US has been studied rather extensively (see e. g. GREENWOOD 1996) and similarly immigration to Canada (GROSS, 2004) , Germany (GLITZ, 2012) , Sweden (LUNDBORG, 2013) , Britain (DUSTMAN et al. (2005 , 2008 and France EDO (2016) . LONGHI, NIJKAMP, and POOT (2010) provide a useful meta-analysis of these studies.
The analyses have ended with very different results. In particular, the debate between David Card and George Borjas has not converged to any sort of consensus. David Card's basic result is that immigration has had no negative impact on American workers. George Borjas' conclusion is quite the opposite: immigration has depressed the wages of low-skill native population considerably while leaving the wages of the rest of population rather unchanged. A recent survey by DUSTMAN et al. (2016) provides a nice overview of different results and possible reasons for apparent differences in results. See also HANSON and MCINTOSH (2016) for an analysis of the motivating factors for migration and PEKKALA et al. (2016) for an analysis of skill composition of emigrants and immigrants.
As said however, the analyses mainly focus on labor market consequences, which we will consider only indirectly. Effects on public finance are obviously much more complicated -especially if one takes into account future income flows (STORESLESLETTEN 2003) . Even so, there have been numerous studies that have tried to assess the effects on public finances. These studies face huge measurement problems because of complexity of the tax and transfer system, transfer of money between government sectors, the use public services, the heterogeneity of immigrants over countries and over time/age, and so on. Therefore, it would be useful to concentrate on cases that are more clear-cut in terms of measurement and interpretation. The provision of local public services is obvious example. Thus far, there has been only a couple of local level studies − the study of GERDES (2011), which makes use of data on Danish municipalities and the study of JOFRE-MONSENY, SORRIBAS-NAVARRO, and VÁZQUEZ-GRENN (2016) that deals with Spanish municipalities' public spending in the early 2000. Both studies consider the issue mainly from the point of the welfare state trying to answer the question: does immigration reduce or increase welfare spending. The question goes back to ALESINA, BAQIR, and EASTERLEY (1999) as well as ALESINA and GLASER (2004) and ALESINA and FERRARA (2005) who argued strongly that ethnic fragmentation strongly reduces welfare spending, i. e. willingness to spend. DAHLBERG, EDMARK, and LUNDQVIST (2012) found accordingly that in Sweden, a larger immigrant population leads to less support for redistribution in the form of preferred social benefit levels. In the same way, SPECIALE (2012) found that immigration has a negative effect on education expenditures. A somewhat related hypothesis was presented by RAZIN, SADKA, and SWAGEL (2002) who argued that low-skilled immigration increases the cost of redistribution and thus reduces the demand for redistributive public spending. STICHNOTH and VAN DER STRAETEN (2013) provide the most recent review of the empirical literature on the effects of ethnic fractionalization on redistribution. GERDES ' (2011) results are somewhat at odds with this "willingness" view suggesting that the size of government does not diminish along with immigration although the results were not very clear-cut and depended on which indicator of welfare spending was used in the estimating equation. JOFRE-MONSENY, SORRIBAS-NAVARRO, and VÁZQUEZ-GRENN (2016) arrived at somewhat different results indicating that local public spending decreases along with immigration density. However, results at the country level seem to contradict this pattern. Thus, GASTON and RAJAGURU (2013) using cross-country data arrived at the result that immigration has rather increased than decreased welfare spending. Our results do not give support to the "willingness-tospend" idea but rather to the"additional expenditures" and also the"set-up" cost (costs of providing services to the first immigrants) hypothesis. In practice this means that an increase in the immigrant population share tends to increase the per capita expenditures to municipality services.
Next, we present the outline of the empirical analysis and the testable hypotheses in more detail in Section 2. After that we introduce the estimating equations and in the same vein summarize the empirical results in Section 3.
After going through the empirical analysis, we make some concluding remarks in the fourth section.
2 The analytical setting
The nature of the relationship
When we focus on the relationship between municipal expenditures and migrant population, there are, of course, many conflicting effects. One effect is just the above-mentioned "supply effect" where the willingness to provide public services depends on the ethnic diversity of the population. We would, however, rather stress the direct cost effect which reflects the fact that immigration tends to increase the costs of public services (and thereby the expenditures). By just considering direct costs and not income transfers the interpretation of empirical results may be more straightforward. This is importance especially because theoretical models provide rather conflicting results on eventual expenditure effects (cf. e. g. MAYR, 2011). Anyway, we have data on municipalities' political background (in a form of the popularity of right-wing vs left-wing parties in the municipality). Using this control variable we could hopefully take into account possible supply side (willingness to pay) effects on municipalities' expenditures. The problem is only that (see e. g. BARONE et al. (2016) ) political attitudes are affected by immigration so that one may not be able to identify the immigration-independent effect of political background.
The problem is that we do not have micro data which would allow for controlling the differences between immigrants and the native population. Thus, in principle, we cannot say whether eventual cost differences reflect different individual characteristics (age, health status, education, gender and so on) or just the foreign background (just "immigration"). We, however, have data on the aggregate level which would suggest that cost differential should in fact be negative. The argument is based on the often recorded observation that the lifecycle profile of public consumption expenditures is U-shaped. Public expenditures are large when an individual is (very) young or (very) old while in between the level of expenditures is very low (Figure 1 ). Finnish population data show that the percentage shares of native population and immigrants in the age groups 0-4, 25-30 and > 72 are the following: 5.61 (1.61), 5.83 (12.41) and 9.20 (2.04); numbers for immigrants being inside parentheses. Thus, the pure demographics effect should rather reduce public expenditures. As for other things, we find that the gender differences are rather small (slight female dominance in native population versus male dominance among immigrants) but it is not clear if it has any implications on expenditures. In schooling, the differences are more important. Thus, 19 % individuals with foreign background have only the lowest (or no) level of education while the corresponding figure for native population is only 4 %. This does not necessary imply that schooling expenditures are larger with immigrants because the concept of foreign background individuals include both first and second generation immigrants but, in general it is understood that immigrants' children stay a much shorter time in the schooling system in Finland.
But why should then immigration (in the form of population share with a foreign background) affect municipalities' expenditures? There are several reasons for that but a common denominator for these costs is the need for providing additional public services. The most apparent reason is language (at least, in a country like Finland where most foreigners do not originally speak the language and the language is also considered difficult to learn in general). In the childcare and school system, extra expenditures have to be used on providing teaching in several other languages. Although there has not been cases in Finland where the language portfolio had included over 30 languages, as it has been the case in the U.S, the existence of the language problem is generally acknowledged (more than ten languages in the primary school has not been an exception).
5 Linguistic problems show up also in the need for interpretation and legal counseling services that also tend to increase municipalities' administrative costs. The employment and poverty rates of people with a foreign background are also quite different from those of the native population, which causes pressure on social assistance and housing assistance. Municipalities also have an obligation to provide community housing and at least in the short-run, migration flows put pressure on community housing. In Finland, municipalities are also responsible for (paying and administrating) social assistance, which is the basic form of income subsidy. Also legal assistance and (during the sample period) consumer guidance are part of municipalities' compulsory services. As for health services, the case is basically ambiguous. These considerations give some idea of the shape of the expenditureforeign background population relationship even though we cannot really predict the exact shape of eventual function form. In our mind, set-up costs of additional devices for immigrants would imply a relative strong positive cost (expenditure) effect at very low level of immigrant population, which translates to high value of the respective elasticity. Beyond some threshold value in terms of immigrant population the effect of these fixed costs would diminish and the elasticity would decrease. It is, however, possible that with very high level of immigrant population per capita expenditures could again increase because of some scale diseconomies of public services.
Identification and estimation
The problem is that causality does not necessarily run only from immigrant population to expenditures (costs) but possibly also in the opposite direction; municipalities with better services are obviously more attractive choices for immigrants. Because migrants (other than refugees) have thus far been able to choose rather freely their domicile, these choices could also explain the positive correlation between municipalities' expenditures and share of the population with a foreign background. The only practical argument against this explanation is the fact that in Finland, central government controls rather extensively the quality of public services (which is a prerequisite for central government's financial assistance to municipalities; roughly one third of municipalities expenditures are coved with government subsidies). Thus, the quality of services ought to be basically the same in all municipalities. But this quality control only represents a sort of minimum quality level and some room is left for "better-than-required" public services, which could provide an incentive to move to some specific municipality. To some extent, we can control this choice by the immigrants' unemployment rate of which we have data on the latter half of the sample period. 6 Immigrants (other than refugees) probably choose municipalities with highest income, lowest unemployment, best social services, largest foreign population, urban environment and so on
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A partial answer to this problem could perhaps be found also from questionnaires that have been conducted in several municipalities to find out the inhabitants' satisfaction to the services that the municipality is providing (see MIETTINEN and VARHE, 2005) . We have used two simple indexes, of which the first corresponds to respondents' assessment of the sufficiency of municipality services (S1) and the other respondents overall level of satisfaction to the level and quality of services (S2). If one computes the correlation coefficients between the share of foreign background population (living in the municipality) and S1 and S2, the values turn out to be −0.020 and −0.391, respectively. Rank correlation coefficients are slightly higher in absolute value. If immigrants value the services of the municipality in the same way as nonimmigrants, the results would suggest that the quantity and quality of services are not a crucial element in determining the choice of particular municipality as the place of residence. Interestingly, the both S1 and S2 are slightly negatively related to per capita expenditures of the municipality which suggests that the quantity and quality of services do not mechanically correspond to expenditures. Of course, it may also be that the inhabitants compare (critically) the services to the level of taxation.
In principle, migrants can choose their domicile freely but this only applies to EU citizens and persons that have a working permit. As for refugees, they are initially placed in a semi-random order in municipalities by the Migration office. If they get the refugee status they can also choose move freely inside Finland. Thus, we can say that some fraction of foreigners in the municipality can be exogenous although we do not have exact municipality-level numbers that could give us a way of identifying exactly the exogenous component of migration.
Otherwise, we try to solve the simultaneity issue in several different ways. First, we may think that the quality of public services as a determinant of immigrant flows is approximately constant over time. This shows up from the highly autocorrelated (0.90) expenditure series. Similarly, the rank correlation between 2000 and 2015 per capita expenditure values is 0.80. Hence the inclusion of fixed effects may already solve the main endogeneity concern.
The second alternative is to use the GMM (Arelano-Bond) estimator and when doing that use some (alternatives sets of) lagged values as the instruments. Technically, this is straightforward but we are short of additional instruments and the most of the data are highly autocorrelated so that it is difficult to find good instruments for the foreign background population variable (see e. g. STOCK et al. (2012) for the consequences of weak instruments). Therefore, the (see e. g. HANSON and MCINTOSH (2016) . To some extent, we can control these with our control variables and fixed effects but still it is clear that the possible endogeneity of the FB variable is a major challenge of the study. respective estimates should rather be considered as robustness checks instead of getting conclusive evidence of the migration -cost channel.
In migration studies, the so-called shift-share instrumenting is used over and over again (cf. e. g. ALTONJI and CARD (1991) and CARD (2001) ; see also the recent (somewhat skeptical) review by RUIST, STUHLER, and JAEGER (2017)). Thus, estimation relies on geographic variation in the concentration of immigrants to identify their impact on the labor market. National inflows of immigrants are interacted with their past geographic distribution to create an instrument to break endogeneity between labor market conditions and the location choice. Unfortunately we cannot really do that because we do not have municipality level data on immigrants' home country nor data on their occupation, age, reason for immigration and so on. These data are available only at the aggregate level. Still we may make use of the approach be using the nation-wide value of immigrants/total population as an instrument. This indeed done in the analysis so that the nation-wide average of foreign-background population is used as an instrument for FB.
In addition to these attempts to control the reverse causality (higher expenditures/better service quality persuade more immigrants to move to the municipality) we restrict the sample to include only observations where total population (or the migrant population) is decreasing. The hypothesis is that if population decreases, public services (or other characteristics) of that specific municipality are not good enough to attract foreigners' immigration. Hence a positive association between municipality expenditures and the relative size of migrant population probably reflects some exogenous flows of migrants to the municipality. Finally, we introduce a dummy variable which obtains the value one if there have been no foreigners in the municipality in the previous period but in current period a nonzero number of foreigners are in the municipality. The hypothesis is that an arrival of (first) foreigners to the municipality requires a fixed cost investment in different facilities (interpreter, guide, social assistance counsellors and like). In a sense, the corresponding variable FX gives a dif-in-dif interpretation for the corresponding set-up costs.
In studying the cost channel, we have a very simple analytical framework. On the one hand, we have municipalities' expenditures -total expenditures and expenditures for major sub-categories -and, on the other hand, we have variables for the demographic structure of the population, most importantly the share of people with foreign background out of total population (denoted by FB).
7 So, we just look at the relationship between (both the level and the rate 
where TC denotes per capita total expenditures, POP total population, DENS population density, OLD the population share of the old (65 + years), YOUNG the corresponding population share of young (0-15 years) people, UN the municipality unemployment rate, logY (a proxy for) log income 8 and Left the share of left-wing parties' municipality council seats. Index i indicates the foreign countries) and also people that have born in Finland prior to 1970 and that speak foreign languages (not Finnish or Swedish). For details, see https://tilastokeskus.fi/tup/maa hanmuutto/maahanmuuttajat-vaestossa. On aggregate level, we know the nationalities and share of (second generation) children but not at the municipality level (for details, the data appendix) 8 FB is expressed in percentage terms. Hence the coefficient directly expresses (semi) elasticity w.r.t expenditures. Y is obtained by dividing per capita tax revenues by the tax rate. Although the municipality tax is basically a flat tax, there is large basic income allowance, which makes the tax rate actually progressive and hence Y is not exactly equal to average pre-tax income of the municipality population.
individual municipality and t the year. The error term is denoted by e it . The model is estimated both in level and logs (and also log differences) but reporting concentrates on the log version, which allows for a semi-elasticity interpretation of the coefficient of the FB variable. Both the random effects and fixed effects version are used, but the comparison tests favor the latter alternative. Unfortunately, there are no data for the volume of expenditures (expenditures in fixed prices) at the municipality level and hence, we have to deflate the expenditure numbers by the aggregate price index of municipalities' production (P) or, alternatively by the (aggregate) wage index of municipalities' employees (W). In addition to total expenditures (TC), we consider two major subcategories of expenditures: education expenditures (EDU) and social and health expenditures (SOS). All these are expressed in per capita terms.
9
The model is estimated with Finnish municipality panel data from 249 municipalities from the period 2000-2014. The total number of data points is 3735, but in practice the number is somewhat smaller. The data and data sources are summarized in Appendix A. This Appendix also provides descriptive statistics for the key variables. A cross-section of the data for 2014 are illustrated in Figure 2 . By scrutinizing the graph, we immediately recognize a set of high expenditure municipalities which are all rather small in terms of population and also in terms of foreign population. Practically all those municipalities are situated in Lapland that is rather a remote and sparsely populated area in northern Finland. Quite obviously, these special circumstances have to be taken into account when considering the mapping between expenditures and demographics.
10 In this study, this is done by using the above mentioned control variables and the fixed effect as well as by weighting the data so that the results correspond better to the nation average (in Finland, the smallest municipality in the sample has only 760 inhabitants while the biggest (Helsinki) has 620,000 inhabitants. 11 As the weight factor, we use the square root of population.
9 All costs are so-called net costs that is, costs of producing services net of services sold and bought to/from other municipalities. The municipality classification corresponds to year 2013, values for municipalities that have ceased to exist (due to consolidation of municipalities) prior to 2013 have been calculated using a simple weighted average method. 10 The relationship between municipalities' costs and population size is analyzed in e. g. MOISIO and UUSITALO (2013) and SAARIMAA and TUKIAINEN (2015) focusing the potential effects of consolidation of municipalities. Similar studies have also been done elsewhere (see e. g. DOLLERY and FLEMING, 2006; REINGEWERTZ, 2012) . In general, these studies suggest that per capita costs follow some sort of U-curve -thus very small and very large municipalities have higher per capita expenditures. 11 The share of foreign background population in Finland was 5.9 % in 2014 but the corresponding unweighted average value for FB variable was only 1.9 %. The smallest municipalities
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Estimation results
Now, let us turn to the results. First, we scrutinize the unweighted data and the results from a conventional panel data set-up where we use both fixed effects (with the level form of the data) and first differences of the data. In Table 1 , we show results for a static model eq. (1). As a rule, we just use the OLS estimator but as pointed out above that may not be appropriate because the key variable, FB, could be endogenous. As already argued, better communal services could provide an incentive to move to the municipality with best services. 12 To account for this possibility, we later (in the context of results in Table 2 ) consider some alternative identification/estimation strategies. The use of fixed effects is a conventional way of taking into account various background variables (like production structure, income level, are located in Åland, which is an autonomous part of Finland. Åland's municipalities are not, however, included in the sample because different financial arrangements and migration policies.
12 The problem is that we do not know the quality of services but only their cost. The unit costs of public services are a poor proxy for the quality because the price level differs significantly between different areas, most notably between Helsinki metropolitan area and Northern Finland. Robust (by municipality) clustered t-ratios are inside parentheses. The sample size is 3735, however with differencing 3486. In the panel setting, RE denotes random (cross-section) and FCE denotes fixed individual (municipality) effects in the estimating equation. See the data appendix for more detailed exposition of all variables. When differencing the left-hand side variable (in column 9, denoted by Diff), all right-hand side variables are also differenced. in column (1) denotes the error-correction term that corresponds to eq. (2) in Table 1 . With this error-correction model, all variables, except the error-correction term, are differenced. *) in eq. (9) is the Jstatistic with instrument rank equals to 51. The set of instruments includes lagged value of the right-hand side variables and also lagged tax rate, lagged municipality's personal/population ratio and lagged real per capita income. With eq. 6 (7), the sample includes only observations with Δpop < 0 (or Δ(FB*POP) < 0). In eq. (8), FB is instrumented by the nation-wide average of foreign-background population (displayed in Figure 4 ).
Notation is otherwise the same as in Table 1 .
Migration Effects location, climate and so on). Unfortunately, individual fixed effects are not completely harmless because they absorb most of the cross-section variation in the data and in terms of demographic effects, only the cross-section variation is of primary interest. Thus, we also produce a set of estimates using the random effects specification (cum the control variables). In fact, this does not make much difference and the elasticity (coefficient estimate) of FB is practically the same as in the fixed effects specification. As pointed out earlier, fixed effects could also be considered from the point of view endogeneity due to high persistence of municipalities' service level. Thus, if we assume that the fixed effects take into account these attractive features in municipality services we could interpret the effects of FB as immigration related cost-push elements. From this point of view, it is interesting that in qualitative (even if not in quantitative) terms the estimation results in terms of the FB variable do not changes even if we introduce the fixed effects. The static models fit into the data reasonably well and show that there is indeed a positive association between the relative share of foreign background population and municipalities per capita expenditures even when we introduce various control variables to the estimating. There is, however, one obvious problem with the results: the residuals are highly autocorrelated and we have to reconsider the dynamic specification (correcting the t-values is not sufficient). We try to solve the problem by using a conventional partial adjustment specification and, alternatively, using an error-correction model which basically uses the static model (augmented with the control values) as the error-correction term.
But what is then the effect of immigration on municipalities' expenditures. The exact value depends very on the control variables but seemingly the biggest difference is due to dynamics of the model. Thus, the static models' results should be compared with long-run elasticities from the partial adjustment specification which is shown below: log TC it =P t ð Þ= c 0i + c 1 FB it + c 2 POP it + c 3 DENS it + c 4 OLD it + c 5 YOUNG it + c 6 UN it + c 7 Y it + + c 8 Left + c 9 log
so that the long-run impact of, say, FB on log(TC/P) would be c 1 /(1-c 9 ). All in all, we seem to arrive at the results that the long-run elasticities are not, after all, that different and the relevant semi-elasticity is roughly one, which means that if the share of the people with foreign background increases from, say, zero to ten percent (that is in fact the range of variation in the data), per capita expenditures increase by 10 %. The elasticity appears to be roughly constant over different segments of the data. Thus, we can basically use the same number to project the evaluation of expenditures for all other values of the FB variable (see, however the caveats that arise when we consider the threshold models in the context of weighted estimated in Table 3 ). 
The dependent variable is log(TC/P). The data in eqs (1)- (3) are weighted by pop ½ . FCE indicates fixed cross-section (municipality) effects. Equations (4)- (7) represent threshold model estimates (the data are then unweighted) . In the eq. (4), the threshold variable is real income with the threshold values 9600 and 12,500, in eq. (5) it is population with the threshold value 8660, in eq. (6) it is population density with the thresholds values 11.30 and 34.55. In eq. (7) is also population density but the equation is estimated with smooth logistic threshold model with the threshold value 5.29 and the slope parameter 12.846. In all equations, the H 0 for linear model is rejected at the 5 % significance level. If the FB variable is used as the threshold variable, a linear model in terms of FB cannot be rejected at the five percent significance level.
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This conclusion even applies to GMM results that are reported in Table 2 . In estimating eq. (2), we experiment rather extensively with different sets of instruments even though it appears that the choice of a specific set of instruments would not crucially affect the results. 13 This may reflect the fact that all instruments share the same persistence nature but the alleviating feature in these results is the fact the result do not change even if the increase the lag length as much as possible which should at least in principle decrease the simultaneity bias. In fact, the GMM results come quite close to the OLS result, which suggests that simultaneity bias is not a fully dominating feature in the data. Also, the use of GLS as the estimator (not reported here) produces estimates that are practically the same as obtained with OLS and GMM.
14 Basically the same result is obtained when the FB variable is instrumented by the aggregate foreign-background population share variable (which is displayed in Figure 3 ). The corresponding estimates in column (8) of Table 3 are quite close to other level form estimates of eq. (2). And in accordance with the IV and GMM estimation results, we find that the coefficient estimates do not change even if focus only municipalities and observations with declining population (total or foreign background population); see eqs (6) and (7) in Table 3 . Thus, the cost effect that is related to foreign population does not seem to depend on how attractive the municipality is. Of course, it could be that municipality services are good, and attract immigration, but other characteristics are much more negative and cause decline in the number of people. But because a positive cost effects is detected even in the case where the absolute number of foreigner decrease this explanation does not sound reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the coefficient of FX variable, which indicates an arrival of first foreigners to the municipality, is positive and statistically significant (eq. (5) in Table 2 ). Thus, there appears to be some set-up costs in arranging services for newly arrived migrants. The coefficient of the FX dummy suggests that the cost effect could be sizeable, i. e. something like 5 %. Of course, we have to keep in mind that the municipalities which in the first place had no foreign population are small remote are non-urban municipalities which are not highly representative from the point of view of all Finnish municipalities.
13 The J-test values are alarmingly large even though they still stay at reasonable levels given the number of instruments. This suggests that the instruments are weak obviously affecting the quality of estimates.
14 Notice that when we use the"partial adjustment type specification" such as in eqs (3)- (13) in Table 3 , the long-run values of the coefficients are roughly three times bigger than the short-run values.
As for the results for the weighted data (Table 3) , the results do not really differ from the unweighted data either. Again we find that the (semi)elasticity of the FB variable is about one (in levels, maybe somewhat lower, but with first differences somewhat larger). Thus, we can say that the results which better correspond to national averages carry the same immigration-expenditure relationship as the unweighted municipality observations.
The coefficients of the control variables seem to follow rather similar patterns for different estimated equations. The share of old people is clearly the most important and robust determinant of per capita expenditures, which obviously makes sense because the cost structure is strongly age-dependent. In the same way, the share of young people tends to increase the per capita expenditures especially in education (see Figure 1 for motivation). Also the income variable Y performs systematically in the right way indicating that part of higher income translates into higher municipality expenditures. Due to lack of municipality level prices, we cannot say whether the income effects show up primarily in the cost level (due to higher wages) or in the volume of municipality services, which in turn could reflect higher income-induced demand for public services. Higher income also implies larger tax base, which makes it possible to finance larger public services (also in the sense of public policy). By contrast the impact of municipality level unemployment is generally negative suggesting that poor employment situation effectively prevents increases in public expenditures.
The sign of population density is generally negative reflecting longer distances, need for decentralization of public service production and diseconomies of scale, which all increase expenditures. By contrast, the sign of the size of the municipality is generally positive which suggests that economies of scale do appear in municipal expenditures (this is in fact consistent with most previous Migration Effects studies). One has, however, to be careful with more far-reaching conclusions with respect to population and population density because they are in time series sense highly multi-collinear and may hence produce spurious coefficient estimates. The political background variable (LEFT) behaves in a bit unexpected way suggesting that political power of left-wing parties rather shows up in lower levels of expenditures than the opposite. This result has an obvious interpretation from the Finnish political landscape. Right-wing parties typical dominate the political life in the rural area in small (small in terms of population) municipalities with generally higher unit costs than big urban municipalities which, in turn, are often dominated by left-wing parties. These parties may have more positive attitude towards immigration but, as said, the marginal impact on per capita costs seems negative. 15 The "LEFT" variable may also reflect low income level ("poor people vote the parties on the left") and that shows up in the tax returns and that in turn in expenditures. From the point of view of this study, the most important fact is, however, the result that introducing the LEFT variable as an extra control does not affect the estimate of the impact of FB on municipalities' costs. One has, however, to be careful in interpreting the coefficients of the political party variables because they surely depend on the nature and scale of immigration (see e. g. BARONE et al. (2016)).
As for other control variables, we also used the unemployment rate of foreign citizens UF. Unfortunately, the municipality level data go back only to year 2009; thus, we were only able to analyze the subsample 2009-2014. Analyses reported in Table 4 show two findings: first, unemployment rate of foreign citizens is positively related to the size of the population with foreign background, presumably reflecting some sort of excess supply factor, and second, the UF variable is positively related to total expenditures even in the case where the FB variable (and other controls) are included. It is not difficult to explain the latter result; it is clear that unemployment creates pressure to public expenditures via different channels -income subsidy, public housing, child care and so on. Perhaps, it is more important to acknowledge the fact that the unemployment rate of foreign citizens is positively related to the (relative) size of migrant population; hence, increase in migrant population affects public expenditures also through externalities of possible increased unemployment.
Finally, the robustness of results is scrutinized by estimating the coefficient of FB for different subset of municipalities that are classified according to the size of the municipality and the share of population with a foreign background. The results that are presented in Figure 4 illustrate quite clearly that the sign of the effects stays the same (with a couple of exceptions, however) but the magnitude of the elasticity varies more. The biggest difference appears to be with municipalities with very few people of foreign background. Unweighted estimates are very high while weighted rather small. The outcome probably reflects the fact that in small municipalities, the set-up costs of basic services for immigrants (such as interpretation or counseling services, translation of documents and so on) are relatively high compared with municipalities with existing facilities. More formal threshold model estimation, cf. e. g. GRANGER and TERÄSVIRTA (1993) , with weighted data suggests, however, that the coefficient of the FB variable is not significantly different over different values of the variable itself. Otherwise, we can detect some (marginally) significant differences, particularly in terms of real income, the size of the municipality, population density and the municipality tax rate (eqs (5)-(8) in Table 3 ). Thus, we find that the coefficient (semi-elasticity) is larger in municipalities with low income and small population. Not so surprisingly we find also that the coefficient is larger in municipalities with low population density (i. e. rural areas in Northern Finland) and with low tax rates. These results could be interpreted as indirect support for the idea of set-up cost -type extra costs for immigrants. The sample size is 1275. UF denotes the unemployment rate of foreign citizens. The weight -variable WG is again the square root of population. The dependent variable is either the foreign citizens' unemployment rate UF (columns 1-2) or the total municipality per capita costs log(TC/P) . Estimates in column 6 denotes by "cross" are weighted GLS estimates with crosssection data (that correspond to average values for each municipality).
Concluding remarks
It seems that immigration at the local level is not cost neutral but stresses municipal finances, at least if the level and/or the rate of change is very big. Surely, this has to be taken into account when designing migration policies. The observation also suggests that highly aggregative (National Accounts level) studies of fiscal effects of migration may miss a point in neglecting some important grass-roots elements of costs at local level where most public services are produced. For instance, it is typically assumed that immigrants use the same amount of public services (usually, after controlling for age and sex) as nonimmigrants. Of course, this kind of problems may equally well apply to benefits from migration. From the analytical point of view, the difficult issue is causality: do municipal expenditures react to migration or does migration react to expenditures (services and transfers provided by local authorities) directly or indirectly. It looks like the first interpretation makes more sense, at least from the point of view of set-up costs for migrants and cost developments in municipalities with declining population. It is also the outcome of opinion surveys that ascertain inhabitants' satisfaction to municipalities' services. Still, it is hard to achieve affirmative evidence on this issue.
Even though our main intention has not been to test the "non-willingness to pay other ethnic groups' expenditures" hypothesis that has been put forward by e. g. Alberto Alesina and Assaf Razin, our results can, of course, be interpreted from this hypothesis' point of view. The positive effect of migration on expenditures, even in the presence of political party controls, does not lend direct support to these hypothesis.
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Data Appendix
The data come from 295 municipalities form Finland and cover the period 2000-2014. The data correspond to the municipalities that existed in 2013. Municipality fusions that took place prior 2013 have been taken into account by computing population weighted averages of municipalities which were independent prior to 2013. Altogether the data include 3735 observations but some of those are lost because of differences and lags. All income and expenditure variables have been deflated by either P or W and expressed in per capita terms. See the tables for details. The main data source is Statistics Finland. The main variables are:
FB foreign background population = people of foreign background include foreign citizens, people speaking foreign languages (and not Finnish or Swedish), foreign born Finnish citizens and their children POP total municipality population DENS population density (population/municipality area in square kilometers) OLD share of old ( >  years) people of total municipality population YOUNG share of young ( <  years) people of total municipality population Y income of households; Y is obtained by dividing per capita tax revenues by the tax rate. In Finland, the municipality tax is flat rate tax although there is a basic deduction TC total operating costs; all costs are so-called net costs; that is, costs of producing services net of services sold and bought to/from other municipalities EDU total (net) education costs SOS total (net) costs for health and social services UN the unemployment rate in the municipality UF unemployment rate of foreign citizens in the municipality Left share of municipality council seats of the following parties: Social democrats, the Greens and the Left party FX dummy for an arrival for first foreigners to the municipality STAFF total municipality personnel/POP REV total tax revenues of the municipality TAX the municipality tax rate P price index of municipalities' production W wage index of municipalities' employees 
